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INTRODUCTION 
 
The demise of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR signaled a rush to 
privatization in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The 
governments of these countries are trying to privatize i.e. transfer state-owned-and-
operated enterprises to private owners and/or managers in order to create a viable private 
sector, capital markets and other institutions and processes, which describe a free market 
capitalist system. However, the pace of privatization has not been the same across the 
board. Whereas some of the Central and Eastern European countries are considered to be 
far ahead in privatization process, Uzbekistan lags behind their former peers from 
socialist camp – Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Estonia and some 
others
1
. This paper argues that despite the fact that there were similarities at the starting 
point of transition, the differences in initial conditions and reform agenda of governments 
in Central Eastern Europe and Uzbekistan accounted for Uzbekistan’s slower pace of 
privatization. The next section of this paper is devoted to analysis of differences in initial 
conditions at the outset of transformation in Central Eastern Europe and Uzbekistan. 
Section III provides an overview of goals of reformers in respective countries. And 
section IV draws conclusions. 
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  Progress in privatization of medium-size and large-scale enterprises is measured by EBRD’s transition 
indicators in EBRD Transition Report 1997. p.  90 
 
There is no historical precedent for the kind of transition from a central-planning 
socialist economy to a free-market economy that is now occurring in the republics of the 
former Soviet Union and Central Eastern Europe. Political structures and processes are 
changing at the same time as economic institutions and processes. Given this and social 
upheaval in these countries, it is not surprising that the privatization process has been 
inconsistent in application, chaotic, and generally difficult. Different approaches, 
techniques and mechanisms have been employed with varying degrees of success and 
results.  
The Uzbek government considers that it has adopted a unique transition strategy 
of gradual, state-guided development, in which stability and equality are principal 
objectives and approach to large-scale privatization is mainly case-by-case and 
opportunistic. Pomfret and Anderson (1997) characterize Uzbek economic policies as 
“inconsistent gradualism”, which have appeared, in many circumstances, reactive, rather 
than part of a consistent strategy. Despite earning a name of a “slow reformer”2, 
Uzbekistan is a transition country that has achieved certain significant changes in 
development of a market-oriented economy and a privatization process in comparison to 
the point when it started its existence as a sovereign state.  
 
II INITIAL CONDITIONS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE 
PRIVATIZATION PROCESS 
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 Classification of Uzbekistan and Central Eastern European countries as slow/fast reformers based on 
rankings produces by World Bank staff (de Melo, Denizer and Gelb, 1996). Also see Desai ed. (1998), 
Wolf, H (1999, p. 5) 
The introductory essay in Earle, et. al. (1993) argues that the diversity in the formulation 
and implementation of the privatization process across Central and Eastern Europe stems 
from differences in the economic and political development of these countries under 
socialism
3
. Disenchantment with central-command system led to creation of property like 
entitlements for managers and workers in Hungary and Poland in the 1980s. After the fall 
of communism, the desire of the insiders to convert these entitlements into formal 
ownership rights influences significantly the structure and the process of privatization. In 
Hungary, by the time the first post-communist government came to power in 1990, most 
property-like entitlements to “socialized assets” had already devolved to enterprise and 
company management – a process termed “spontaneous” privatization. Both large and 
small-scale privatization in Poland is marked by special treatment of insiders - thanks to 
the “privileges” won by Solidarity in fighting against Communist authorities in 1980s. It 
is at that time Solidarity succeeded in shifting control over “socialized enterprises” from 
the authorities to insiders/workers. By contrast, different levels of greater centralization 
of economy before the collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia and Romania resulted 
in the authorities taking full control over the privatization process. This significantly 
limited the role of insiders in privatization in these countries. However, despite similar 
centralized approaches in Czechoslovakia and Romania, the degrees of success measured 
by speed, revenues, and post-privatization economic development are notably different in 
these two countries.  
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For details see Earle, J., Frydman, R. and Rapaczynsky, A, (1993). Privatization in the transition to a 
market economy: studies of preconditions and policies in Eastern Europe. London : Pinter 
Privatization and post-privatization economic development in the CIS, including 
Uzbekistan, is in even less favorable, compared to the Central European countries, 
conditions because of the following reasons: 
 Memory of capitalism is much weaker in the CIS, because it is further removed in 
time; 
 Deeper militarization of the economy in the former USSR. This increases the number 
of steps to be undertaken before privatization to include restructuring of military 
complex enterprises – a daunting task by itself; 
 Collapse of the COMECON market is accompanied by the dissolution of the former 
Soviet Union and disruption of almost all the horizontal and vertical economic ties of 
the enterprises; 
 Worldwide economic recession in 1989\91 coincided with the political revolutions in 
the Former Soviet Union. For example, Michael Kaser points out that in 1993 the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe  (ECE) found that restrictive 
actions against eastern imports had been taken by Western governments against 
Central Europe (12 cases) and Former Soviet Union (8 cases)
4
. These actions were 
taken in response to the economic recession; 
 Another important factor was the geographic remoteness from the attractive Western 
markets;  
 Reliance on exports of oil, gas, metals and minerals in the USSR led to the creation of 
unbalanced economies for the newly independent states. 
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 Kaser, M. (1995) Privatization in the CIS. London: Russian and CIS Programme, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. 
These negative factors resulted in economic decline, which was much larger in the 
CIS than in CEE. According to EBRD, while for all the transition countries of CEE and 
former USSR output decline was 29 per cent, in the CIS only, this figure was equal to 44 
per cent.
5
 Although Uzbekistan’s GDP in 1997 stood at 87 per cent of 1989 level, – 
smallest decline for the former Soviet Republics, it is clear that major decline had been 
prevented mainly due to particularities of the Uzbek economy based on exploitation of 
natural endowments.  Uzbekistan was able to sustain in a due level production of raw 
materials and minerals, which contributed major part of GDP. It is common knowledge 
that production of raw materials and minerals is much less complex and does not suffer 
from disruption of economic ties as much as production of more complex products does. 
Uzbekistan’s starting position is quite different from the conditions of other former 
USSR republics. For instance, at independence, Uzbekistan was the third, in terms of 
population, and the second poorest republic of the former Soviet Union
6
. For the Soviet 
economy, Uzbekistan served as a supplier of raw materials (cotton) and minerals (gold 
and uranium). In most of Central Asia no modern institutions of market economy ever 
existed, while Central Europe and Baltic states had experienced market system before 
communist rule. Even Russia and Ukraine had been briefly “exposed” to capitalism 
before 1917.  
Furthermore, prior to gaining independence none of the Central Asian countries 
had exercised significant influence over their economy. For example, Kazakhstan 
government claims that before 1991, 90% of its industry was controlled from Moscow 
via all - Union Ministries. Therefore, at independence, there were no national institutions 
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 From EBRD table published in Financial Times 5 August, 1998 
6
 According the data collected by Pomfret (2000, p. 736) 
with experience of developing and managing industrial policy or of supervising state 
owned enterprises 
7
. Before embarking into reform process, Uzbekistan, as well as other 
Central Asian countries, had to start with formation of sovereign state
8
, creating 
government institutions able to grasp fully the economy of the country. This inescapably 
led to a new list of problems on top of the “usual” list, the reformers engaged in 
privatization in transition states face.  
Another key factor is the structure of economy that the Uzbek government 
inherited from the Soviet Union. The volume of industrial production in Uzbekistan 
remains very low in both absolute and per capita terms
9
. Reliance on cotton, gold, and 
minerals make it possible for the government to put privatization lower in the priority list 
of reform steps. Since the share of industrial sector, with which privatization is mostly 
associated, is not as big as in most of the Central Europe (see Table 1 below), it is, 
apparently, more difficult for it to win closer attention of policy-makers compared to 
sectors engaged in production of cotton and gold.  
 
Table 1. Structure of the GDP and Work Force (in per cent)
10
: 
Country Indicator Sector 1990 1991 
Uzbekistan Share of GDP Agriculture 33.1 37 
  Industry 22.4 22.4 
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 Henley, J., (1995) Restructuring large scale state enterprises in the republics of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan: the challenge for technical assistance 
8
 B. Islamov (1998), “State-Led Transformation and Economic Growth in Central Asia: From Plan to 
Industrial Policy”. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics; 39(2), December 1998, pp. 102. 
9
 Rumer, Boris and Stanislav Zhukov eds. Central Asia: Challenges of Independence. Armonk, NY and 
London: Sharpe, 1998 
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 Sources: Rumer, Boris and Stanislav Zhukov eds. Central Asia: Challenges of Independence. Armonk, 
NY and London: Sharpe, 1998 and EIU country reports. 
 
  Construction 10.5 10.5 
  Services 34.0 26.5 
Kazakhstan Share of Share of GDP Agriculture 34.5 28.1 
  Industry  20.8 
  Construction  12.0 
  Services  32.7 
Kyrgizstan Share of GDP Agriculture 33.7 37.0 
  Industry 27.0 28.5 
  Construction 7.9 6.6 
  Services 31.4 27.9 
Czech Republic Share of GDP Agriculture 7.2 5.6 
  Industry 50.0 54.9 
  Construction 8.6 6.3 
  Services 34.5 33.1 
Slovakia Share of GDP Agriculture 7.4 5.7 
  Industry 49.9 52.7 
  Construction 9.2 7.4 
  Services 33.5 34.5 
Hungary Share of GDP Agriculture 12.5 8.0 
  Industry 26.7 26.9 
  Construction 6.0 5.1 
  Services 54.8 60.0 
Poland Share of GDP Agriculture 8.5 9.3 
  Industry 43.6 39.2 
  Construction 9.5 10.9 
  Services 38.4 40.6 
Russia Share of GDP Agriculture 19.9  
  Industry 42.2  
  Construction 12.7  
  Services 25.2  
 
 
Since Uzbekistan has to start from such a low base, it seems hardly possible for 
the government to afford a more ambitious privatization program a la Central European 
countries. Thus, not only initial conditions play a crucial role in shaping up ownership 
profile of privatized enterprises, but they also determine the pace and the speed of 
privatization as well. However, initial conditions are not the only determinants of 
privatization progress in Uzbekistan. Government’s formulation of goals for privatization 
also influenced the privatization process. 
 
III. GOALS OF PRIVATIZATION IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE AND 
UZBEKISTAN 
 
Former Prime-Minister of the Czech Republic Vaclav Claus maintains that privatization 
in Western countries, e.g. Thatcherian privatization in the UK, has almost nothing to do 
with the task that Central and Eastern Europe is facing. On the one hand, privatization in 
Central and Eastern Europe is a process of establishment of property rights structure that 
previously either did not exist, or was very strange. On the other hand, in the West, the 
privatization could be viewed as a reform process when a standard shift of property rights 
between well-defined economic agents takes place
11
.  
As to objectives of the governments in the privatization process, these include, 
first of all, a complex economic transformation, rather than the maximization of the 
proceeds from the sale of its assets. The speed of the process is absolutely essential. The 
slower the pace of privatization, the lower is the proceeds from privatization. Hence, the 
main goal of privatization is restructuring of the economy. In other words, the principle 
goal of privatization is to improve resource allocation. The individual restructuring of 
enterprises will follow after privatization.  
Similarly, Colin Jones, comparing privatization programs in Central and Eastern 
Europe, industrialized countries and developing nations, concludes that in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union privatization is a part of the process of 
creating afresh a market economy and all its legal, commercial, financial and institutional 
infrastructure. Moreover, private ownership and private property rights are perceived to 
be a bedrock of a democratic society. By contrast, in industrial countries, privatization is 
a marginal adjustment in ownership rights in established economies.  
Unlike the central planning, market economy based on private ownership 
disperses the risks and reduces the magnitude of the consequences of an error. Private 
ownership also subjects businesses to the threat of bankruptcy or take-over and so fosters 
competitive environment. Furthermore, the resources are likely to be allocated more 
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 See Bohm, A., and Simoneti, M. (1994) Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe. Ljubljana: 
C.E.E.P.N. p. 8. 
 
efficiently by decentralized competition, rather than by the bureaucratic processes of 
centralized planning. 
However, Colin Jones opposes hasty privatization schemes. Since privatization is 
a part of the process of economic transformation, it will succeed only when accomplished 
in complex with other economic reform measures. Privatization is not feasible without 
prior macroeconomic stabilization and creation of the legal and institutional infrastructure 
for a market economy. In other words, first step is demand adjustment: liberalization of 
prices and foreign trade; establishment of realistic exchange rates and internal 
convertibility of the local currency; and tightening of the monetary and fiscal policy. The 
next step is creating a framework of civil and commercial law; independent judicial 
system; competitive banking and financial system
12
. 
However, almost all the CIS countries, unlike Poland and Czechoslovakia, 
introduce only price decontrol at a stroke - and the Russian government is alone in adding 
in current account convertibility and mass privatization to their respective programs of 
transition
13
.  
Financial and legal infrastructure for trade in property remains undeveloped 
throughout the CIS. High proportion of shares held by management and workers protects 
employment, defers restructuring and foreign investment.  
Martin Spechler’s (Iatridis, Hopps 1998) conclusion on the pace and goals of 
privatization is different to that of Colin Jones and Vaclav Claus. According to him, a 
gradual mixed strategy of transition and privatization would be more acceptable to more 
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people that would doctrinaire of shock therapy
14
. Slow approach, sensitive to hardships of 
people, would make a privatization scheme more popular among ordinary citizens and 
gain support of a population. Wide support and less severe consequences on the people 
will improve the results of privatization and restructuring.  
It seems that Martin Spechler’s approach is somewhat similar, in certain 
instances, to the Uzbek government’s strategy of economic reform. The creation of a 
socially oriented market economy and step- by- step transition are parts of state–led 
reform agenda in Uzbekistan (I. Karimov, 1992, p. 37). It is based on the five principles 
formulated by President I. Karimov: 
 The economy has priority over politics; 
 The main agent of reform is the state; 
 Priority is to be given to law and legal obedience; 
 Adherence must be given to a strong social policy, which takes into account 
the demographic structure of the nation; 
 Transition to a market economy must come through evolutionary means15; 
Privatization policy based on this strategy has accentuated the general 
privatization process. In Uzbekistan, small-scale private activity, both legal and illicit, 
had been quite well developed
16. Therefore, the government’s first priority, at the 
inception of privatization process, became small privatization. From late 1992 until mid – 
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 See Kaiser, M. (1995) Privatization in the CIS. London: Russian and CIS Programme, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. 
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 Iatridis, D. and Hopps, J. (1998) Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe : perspectives and 
approaches. Westport, Conn.; London: Praeger. 
15
 I. Karimov, Uzbekistan – sobstvennaya model perekhoda na rynochnie otnoshenia, Tashkent, 1993 p.p. 
37-38 
 
1994 53 000 businesses had been sold or leased to mainly to employees. By the end of 
1996 small privatization had been complete.  
However, the first wave of privatization has not led to a logical next step – large-
scale privatization. The mass privatization launched in 1996 has not given controlling 
stakes in industrial companies to private owners. Private Investment Funds (PIFs) are 
bidding for minority stakes not exceeding 30% in 150 medium-to-large size companies.  
Within the past two years the Uzbek government has indicated several times its 
intent to move more decisively to attract foreign investments. In 1998, Uzbekistan 
announced international tenders for some of its largest industrial assets. However, only 
one large chemical plant had been sold. In 1999, tender for Almalyk copper plant, one of 
the largest and potentially profitable enterprises in Uzbekistan was cancelled
17
. Pace of 
large-scale privatization still remains slow. There are many problems, which slow down 
privatization process in Uzbekistan, such as, unrealistic price expectations, difficult 
investment environment, non-convertibility of the local currency, and slump in 
commodity prices. However, the main reason for this, in addition to difficult initial 
conditions, seems to be the perception of privatization goals by Uzbek reformers. While 
for Central European reformers the speed of the process is the main objective, Uzbek 
reformers seem to be more concerned with maintaining control over the enterprises being 
privatized, which, in fact, contradicts to the idea of privatization itself.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
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 A definition used by Kaiser, M. (1997) The Economies of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. London: Russian 
and CIS Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs.  
17
 See for details EBRD Transition Report, 1999. 
Privatization will play crucial role in the ongoing transformation process in Central 
Eastern Europe and Uzbekistan. Through privatization the governments can create 
incentives for enterprises to increase production and improve quality fuelling economic 
growth. Privatization should create political constituency of new owners and commercial 
lenders who would exert political pressure for putting in place governance mechanisms. 
Whereas some of the Central European and former Soviet republics are almost 
finishing up their privatization programs, Uzbekistan has been often criticized for the 
lack of political willingness to press ahead with large-scale privatization in fear of higher 
unemployment and bankruptcies. However, evaluation of Uzbek privatization 
performance should be considered in the context of initial conditions at the outset of 
transition and policy objectives, which, sometimes, determined by these conditions. 
Initial conditions remarkably slowed down large-scale privatization in Uzbekistan at the 
start of reforms. They not only influenced policy goals of privatization notably at a later 
stage, but also, to certain extent, limited options for Uzbek reformers. As Uzbek 
government declared adherence to socially oriented market economy and a strong social 
policy, which takes into account the demographic structure of the nation, it has become 
increasingly reluctant to give up ownership control over large enterprises and determined 
to increase privatization revenues
18
. Apparently, Uzbek government perceives that by 
maintaining ownership control over enterprises, it could avoid increase in unemployment. 
It seems that Uzbek government also expects that a privatization windfall would assist in 
easing budget deficit and help meet increasing amount of external debt obligations.  
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 It should be noticed that the two tasks do not seem to reconcile with each other well. One can not have 
their cake and eat it. 
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